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Introduction

Part 1: The Challenge

to

Authority

In this paper, I want to examine and challenge certain
criticisms of Dewey's conception of authority. These criticisms are, broadly speaking, of two species. The first set of
criticisms involves what critics have labeled Dewey's "strong"
authority. These critics, the so-called "Illinois Revisionists,"
argue that embedded in Dewey's social and educational
philosophy are assumptions about authority that lead the
critics to speculate that the legitimation of authority is predicated upon an expert, professional class. This class maintains
power and social control through the use of scientific, technical, and rational means. In terms of education, these critics
conclude that schooling is a vehicle for the inculcation of
positive values regarding science and technology and their
importance in the modern world.
A second set of criticisms comes from the historian John
Patrick Diggins, who argues Dewey as having a "weak"
conception of authority. The argument here is that, as Dewey
presupposes no metaphysical ends, and no fixed historical
knowledge to draw upon, little is left over to hitch authority
onto in terms of social control. What is left are individual
experiences; clearly not enough to make value judgments regarding social issues. Furthermore and with respect to
education, as teacher authority is said by Dewey to be minimal, and no fixed, philosophical educational "ends" are
allowable, there is little to guide authority in determining
future educational direction.
I intend to explore these arguments further, and then to
challenge them. This will occur through a reconsideration of
Dewey's position on authority-both social and educational.
After completing this reconsideration, I will be in a position
to bring the completed results to bear on the criticisms themselves. My thesis is that, while Dewey is clearly able to
refute certain of these criticisms, others continue to hold. In
particular, I concur with those arguments that read Dewey as
having posited no metaphysical or educational "ends" and
further positing that these ends are necessary ones if anything other than a contingent authority is to evolve. I maintain that Diggins and those who agree with him will not be
satisfied by Dewey's response.

There have been several challenges to Dewey's estimation of the role and scope of authority. A number of these
challenges developed out of an increasing discomfort with
the socially and economically conservative American political scene of the 1950's. Pragmatism, viewed as a philosophical tool for increasingly authoritarian government, came into
disrepute in the 1960's, as a more broadly leftist, revisionist
assault on American politics and culture emerged. Works such
as Cristopher Lasch's The New Radicalism in America, critical as it was of the Liberal state and in particular, pragmatism
and its later progressivist manifestation, led to a flurry of
theses to the effect that "the manipulative note was rarely
absent from their writings: the insistence that men could best
be controlled and directed not by the old crude method of
force but by 'education' in its broadest sense...[T]he
progressives' faith in education...often served as a rationalization for a crude will to power on the part of the intellectuals themselves" (1965, p. 146).
Of course those fearful of the effects of the growing
bureaucratic technocracy did not maintain a stranglehold on
criticism of the progressivist movement. Inasmuch as
progressivism was tied to the larger philosophical base that
was pragmatism, social critics of the more traditionalist bent
who insisted on a firm metaphysical foundation for social
planning found Dewey and his followers short on provisions
as well. A metaphysically bereft philosophy left nothing but
an anemic conception of authority based not upon timeless
principles, rather the vagaries of science and experimentation. Robert Hutchins provides a clear example of this line of
thinking. "The difference between us and Mr. Dewey is that
we can defend Mr. Dewey's [social] goals and Mr. Dewey
cannot. All he can do is say he is for them. He cannot say
why, because he can appeal only to science, and science
cannot tell him why he should be for science or for democracy or for human ends" (1944, p. 1316).
More recent criticisms of Dewey's pragmatic conception of authority owe their allegiance to these earlier ones.
Criticisms of Dewey's crypto-authoritarian model of progressive education, together with criticisms of Dewey as having
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an inadequate conception of authority for lack of a
foundationalist metaphysics, stand fast. I wish now to
develop more closely some of the arguments on both sides of
this debate regarding authority, and specifically to ask of each
side two general questions. The first deals with the belief of
what, for Dewey, authority amounts to, and the second deals
with how and who legitimizes or authorizes the authority to
be utilized. I begin with those critics who I argue posit a
"strong" view of Deweyan authority and finish with one very
recent critic who posits a weak view.
Strong Authority:

The Case of the

Illinois

Revisionists
The Illinois Revisionists, so named by Robert Westbrook
(1991, p. 186),' are a group of historians and philosophers of
education who criticize Dewey very broadly for offering "a
philosophic justification for the dominant economic organization of the period...[and]...never seriously challenging]
the power sources within American society" (Karier et al,
1973, p. 85-86). For Clarence Karier, authority was never
brute force; rather, it was the insidious social control of further and further "scientifically rationalized orderly change..."
(Karier and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992, p. 113), Dewey's pragmatism offered a justification for the crypto-authoritarianism of
a professionally-managed society through his constant
pronouncements on the importance of "the faith in progress,
science and technology and the belief that science and technology might resolve virtually all social problems..." (Karier
and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992, p. 113). I turn now to examine
more closely how this argument works.
Dewey supposedly advocated a public that was premised
on the unhindered nature of inquiry. Inquiry was a method,
chiefly a scientific one, for settling individual, social, political, and educational concerns. The factual data that was
generated by inquiry in its most formalized state lay in the
domain of academics, scientists, and others primarily belonging to centers of higher education (Karier and Hogan, in Tiles,
1992, p. 119). The knowledge generated in the universities
conferred a degree of expertise on those who undertook it,
and thereby was used to legitimize the newly minted class of
professionals who went on to transform the social system
based on their findings (Karier and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992,
p. 113).
As professionalized, scientific rationality transformed the
social system, so it was that increasingly, experts and expertise came to rule politics. The professionalized middle class,
a class that Dewey himself belonged to (Karier and Hogan,
in Tiles, p. 112), became the final arbiters of social change.
Relying on university-based experts, this class utilized a
rationalized and technological approach to solving social and
educational concerns; an approach which, characteristically,

Education and Culture Summer 2001 Vol. XVII No. 2

relied not on the public to settle disputes or provide for new
possibilities, but rather experts of the professional middle
class's own choosing. The knowledge and decisions of the
experts would be internalized in the body public such that
the public would come to see the technico-rational reasoning-out of social problems and the resultant social control as
the norm. Ultimately, it was argued, Dewey advocated the
"use of state power to control the future through shaping the
thought, action, and character of its citizens" (Karier et al,
1973, p. 87).
Education was of course a major means for state power
to undertake this process. To inculcate in young,
fertile minds a sense of the grandeur and importance of
science, technology, and its potential for solving social problems, together with the importance of having an "expert" class,
was said to be a major concern for Dewey. As such, the teacher
must be at least somewhat authoritarian in her dealings with
the students. Participatory democracy, while necessary as an
educational ideal for students and teachers alike, was not
manifest in the classroom. Rather, teachers, by the very
nature of the task of promoting and inculcating these new
values, had to adopt an authoritarian posture in order to
accomplish necessary instruction. As Mary Ann Ray wid notes
"Fundamentally incompatible demands push the teacher to
function more as demagogue than as duly constituted democratic leader. To be successful educators, teachers must be
engineers and manipulators of consent, highly accomplished
at attaching learner purposes to the service of educational
ends. For Dewey teachers clearly cannot function as teachers
if classroom decisions actually are made on the basis of one
vote per person-yet perhaps nothing is more fundamental to
political democracy than this formal provision for equal
power" (in Tiles, 1992, p. 257).2
If all this is true of Dewey's supposedly benign call for
science and technology to be a central feature of the classroom, then certain conclusions follow. It is tantamount to
saying that the need to foster certain intellectual habits in
individual children licenses the teacher ( and the educational
"system" and the broader society the teacher represents) to
manipulate her students in the name of a greater social good.
One must consider the possibility that this is a variant of
"pernicious manipulation" as Feinberg calls it (1975, p. 240).3
That is, a peculiar self-interest is involved in the act of
manipulation. While it may not seem so, prima facie, because
the teacher apparently acts in the public's interest, nevertheless, it remains problematic because, even if it is not
obviously pernicious, yet there may be a good argument for
limiting the amount of manipulation that goes on in the classroom, as many educators believe the child's innate curiosity
is what should be further developed, and coercive manipulation on the teacher's part may serve to stifle this. Further, the
public interest, if we are to believe Karier, is actually the
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interest of an entrenched expert middle class who represent
primarily themselves. If the definition of pernicious manipulation is extended to a certain class self-interest, then the
change may be apropos to Dewey's classroom, and render
his overall argument problematic.
To summarize: what we have from the Illinois school
and like-minded revisionists is a view of Dewey as having a
strong authoritarian notion of social control. Authority is
considered coeval with a cryptic, technico-rational social control. It is vested in a professional class of primarily university-based experts who thereby legitimize it. There is little
opportunity for meaningful public discourse, as peoples are
manipulated into believing in the possibilities of science and
technology exclusively, as well as in the necessity of an
expert "ruling" class. Further, the classroom operates in an
equally authoritarian manner, as manipulation and control
must occur if children are to benefit from habitualizing these
novel social goods.
Weak Authority:

The Case of John Patrick

Diggins

Diggins offers a radically different account of the shortcomings of Deweyan authority. For Diggins, the problem is
not a cryptic, insidious authority premised on social control
via a coterie of predominantly university-based, middle class
professional scientists and researchers. Rather, it concerns
the lack of a specific and necessary type of authority, one
connected to agreed upon historical principles or timeless
metaphysical values that can be hooked onto for stability
(1994, p. 206).4
"Dewey had his work cut out for him. Where classical
writers looked to transcendent ideas or the historical past
for true knowledge, Dewey looked to probable hypotheses
and present problems as the place where useful knowledge
asserts itself. And where ancient philosophers looked to
thought as the ordering agency that would give society ideas
at which to aim, Dewey believed that practical activity
itself could serve as an ideal by which men could order their
lives. Dewey's pragmatic naturalism, locating the origins
and validity of ideas in human experience, arrived at a
conclusion that turned upside down the assumptions of classical thought: authority, like truth, is neither given by nor
revealed to the theoretical intellect, but instead is produced
by human activity" (1994, p. 221).
Although traditional means of legitimizing authority were
said to be anathema for Dewey, yet Dewey did indeed have a
conception of authority. Authority is said by Dewey to be
found in the "reflective enterprise that enables man [sic] to
take his bearings in a chaotic world" (1994, p. 226). Authority is vested in one's cognitive and decision-making capabilities, though to be sure, this is not thereby an individualis-
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tic enterprise, as Dewey is clear that the formation of one's
cognitive and decision-making abilities necessitates a shared
activity. The transformation of authority was a transformation of authority from a set of political and religious ideals
under the guise of "duty" and Christian "sacrifice" to what
Diggins has termed "the reflective enterprise" (1994, p. 215).
The previous conceptions of authority now serve as the
enemy of modernity and the triumph of modernity is said to
be one's own self-interested experience of the chaotic world
(1994, p. 215).
Diggins has problems with Dewey's situation of authority in the reflective enterprise of one's own experience. "If
authority derives from everyday experience, how can the
contingencies of experience yield order and stability? If
authority does not lie in a source external to and independent
of man's actions, how can it govern his actions?" (1994,
p. 222). Furthermore, Diggins argues that Dewey's insistence
on placing authority in the sphere of reflective intelligence
forces authority into the fold of experimentation. This forces
authority to wait, to suspend judgment until the process of
verification, of testing, takes place. Unfortunately, Diggins
argues, a particular direction often needs to be taken before
experience can render a judgment and authority can pronounce
that decision as valuable. Thus it is that "if pragmatic knowledge must always be from hindsight, of what value is it in
guiding our thoughts prior to activity?" (1994, p. 234).
Finally, Diggins turns to the classroom to examine the
role and scope of authority in education. Again, Diggins is
critical: in this instance with respect to Dewey's refusal to
identify pre-determined ends for education. Diggins argues
that by not allowing education to define certain predetermined ends, and by allowing such nebulous ends as
"growth" to reign in position of authority over the classroom,
Dewey cannot say on what basis certain specific educational
values are to be accepted or determined, whether of the
student or the teacher, as no end that can serve as a beacon or
a guide is allowed to exert itself beyond the vague "growth"
and the too-local "ends-in-view." (1994, p. 314). Once again,
Dewey's refusal to specify certain philosophic ends that can
serve as guides forces him to abandon any meaningful
authority in educational aims in exchange for individual
self-interest and the contingencies of experience.
To summarize: Diggins does indeed find Dewey a
philosopher of authority. But this authority is not one of
predetermined ends or of certain values. Rather it is the
authority of reflective experience and intelligent judgment;
an authority that pronounces over past experience only, and
cannot serve as a guide to future actions. It is legitimated not
by any social body, political enterprise, or tradition; rather
by experience itself, and the judgments therein. As such it is
a very individual, self-interested authority that has no claims
on the possibility of future social action.
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Part 2: Towards
Concept

of

a Reconsideration

of

Dewey's

Authority

I wish now to reconsider Dewey's take on authority
through an examination of his social, political and educational works. I say reconsider because, although Dewey
clearly has a conception of authority, it is often embedded, as
his critics point out, in social practices, intelligent method,
the development of habit, and other concrete activities that
render difficult a precise characterization of just what authority
is. Clearly though, one must attempt a working characterization of authority in order to further attempt its legitimation
and operation. As Dewey does not provide but a very broad
one, I choose another to help accomplish this task. Kenneth
Benne argues that authority occurs when one "...grants
obedience to another person, to a group, or to a method or
rule, with a claim to be able to assist him in mediating this
field of conduct or belief, as a condition of the grant of such
assistance. Any operating social relationship of this sort is an
authority relationship" (1938, p. 2).
Now this working characterization is still very broad,
but also very much within the spirit of Dewey. It suggests
that any characterization of authority must have about it qualities of guidance, direction, and relationship. As I will show,
these qualities serve a very important role in the manner by
which authority is legitimated. Both Dewey and Dewey's
critics would agree, I think, with Benne's estimation that authority "is a necessity of all stable community life" (1938, p.
27). What they would dispute is rather the way in which it is
manifested, as well as who or how it becomes legitimized. In
Benne's estimation and in Dewey's estimation as well,
authority is bound up with "the pervasive contribution of
scientific findings and method to nearly all functions of
modern life..." (1938, p. 26). This is just what the Illinois
school and Diggins want to dispute, though obviously, for
different reasons. But it will soon become clear that there is
no extricating Dewey from an insistence that authority is
bound up with method. Indeed, one might agree with Benne
inasmuch as, if there were to be one characteristic of method
that Dewey claims is certain, it is that authority is method:
the method of organized intelligence (1938, p. 172).
I will come back to this point shortly. Right now
however, I want to develop from Dewey the manner in which
authority manifests itself in social relations. I want to
construct a model of authority on two levels. The first level
deals with authority in social and political spheres. The
second deals with authority in education, and more narrowly,
the classroom. Both levels of inquiry rest on two as yet
untested assumptions. The first is that authority is coeval with
organized intelligence, or method, as Benne insists. The
second is that it is the public and not any exclusive individual
or group interest that legitimizes authority. I will proceed first
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to argue that authority for Dewey does equate with organized
intelligence, and I will discuss what this means. Secondly, I
will show that organized intelligence is coeval with public
intelligence. This completed, I will argue that authority is the
composite of organized public intelligence that all are able to
participate in, and further, that education, as a broadly public
venture, is the means by which organized intelligence is
cultivated. Organized intelligence is the chief goal of education on a public level, and represents no one particular group
or class interest. Once these points are adequately developed
and addressed, I will be in a position to turn once again to
Dewey's critics and test out their various estimations of
authority as it is manifested in Dewey's writings.
It is in Authority and Social Change that Dewey's strongest statements regarding the nature of authority emerge. "We
need an authority that, unlike the older forms in which it
operated, is capable of directing and utilizing change and we
need a kind of individual freedom unlike that which the unrestrained economic liberty of individual has produced and
justified; we need, that is, a kind of individual freedom that
is general and shared and that has the backing and guidance
of socially organized intelligent control" (1990, p. 137). Now
Dewey is referring to a phenomenon he sees as a holdover
from a previous, laissez-faire style liberalism; one that placed
individual rights and desires ahead of social ones (1990,
p. 25). Although this liberalism at one time served well the
democratic interests, yet it failed to provide an adequate answer to the pressing social problems which are encountered,
in part, as a result of newer technological possibilities (1990,
p. 25). Such technological changes bring with them consequences which, if democracy is going to survive and peoples
prosper, require a fundamental shift from an individualist
conception of authority as imposition and its opposite as
being freedom.
Organized intelligence is the chosen response to laissezfaire style liberalism. Science is the most reliable evidence
we have that organized intelligence can solve complex
public problems (1991, p. 168-169). In the long run, what
dictates for Dewey the necessity of placing authority in the
method of organized intelligence is its track record with
respect to scientific and technological innovations (1990,
p. 141). By making organized intelligence, and in particular,
its method, the locus of authority, Dewey is suggesting first
of all, that anything which is to be given value over other
determinations is subject to some kind of inquiry, hypothesis
testing, or experimentation. Secondly, should method determine that a change in the initial determination is necessary
owing to new consequences, or new factual data being
presented, the value placed on that initial determination must
also change (1991, p. 242-243). With method, the value of
anything is contingent and cannot be relied upon as a fixed
principle from which to operate. Although, as Dewey argues,
one inherits one's morality to a large extent from one's social
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group via the speech patterns (1988, p. 43), yet the authority
of this morality, as with the morality itself, is always contingent on further inquiry. If inquiry determines that a particular
value or moral worth is untenable, then that value or moral
worth must be questioned.
Furthermore, organized intelligence is public intelligence.
The great mass of peoples do not live in isolation from one
another. They form groups and share interests. They belong
to communities, societies, and cultures. One might be tempted
to locate organized intelligence solely in the individual
experiencer, as many if not all of the laissez-faire individualist models did. However, this, as Dewey argued, presented
problems because the theory of epistemological "correspondence" that provided the foundation for much of the early
liberalism was itself faulty. The Lockean/Humean view that
intelligence arose from the reconstruction of atomistic or isolated events was predicated upon an individualist theory of
cognition with little to say about how communities, groups,
societies, and cultures could come to inquire into a particular
problem (1990, p. 33). A conception of intelligence not
fastened to an empirical, atomistic psychology was needed if
a "transformed" liberalism was to emerge. This "transformed"
intelligence, as with this "transformed" liberalism, was to take
its bearings not from an individualistic spectator theory of
the world, rather from a conception of intelligence and
cognition that involved the organism fused into an organic
whole with its environment. The focus was not exclusively
on environment, nor on perceiver, but rather the transformation of the two through mutual interaction (1988, p. 172).
What this did for environment was to give it a larger
stake in the overall process of cognition. Environment, once
considered of little consequence with regards to the overall
function of cognition beyond supplying material to be worked
upon, could now be shown to have a demonstrative effect
upon the interacting individual. Certain environments, for
Dewey, were privileged above others. Important for Dewey
was the environment of other peoples, broadly considered as
the social or public realm. The manner in which this environment came to affect particular individuals was via the
medium of communication. Through the give and take of
communicative exchange, peoples could be transformed
(1988, p. 132-134). Organized intelligence involved the
selective habitualizing of one's responses to this transformation: it involved active reflection and inquiry in determining
what the best response to a given social environment would
be, and what response was to be valued. The procedure of
organized intelligence, the method of inquiry adopted on a
social scale, allowed diverse peoples to come together in what
Dewey called "conjoint communication" around a particular
social consequence of a private act, (1989, p. 73). These
consequences could then be deliberated upon, with inquiry
as the guide. It is in this way that intelligence is transformed
into a public activity.

5

The public is to be the locus of inquiry. But this begs
immediately the question of who, precisely, constitutes the
public? Dewey felt the public at the time he wrote to be "lost
...bewildered..." (1989, p. 117), and "eclipsed" (1989,
p. 110). This was due primarily to the overabundance of
multiple publics, combined with the lack of an effective means
of shared inquiry. What was necessary in Dewey's estimation was a reconstruction of the public via the instruments of
inquiry (1989, p. 73). Problems that confronted particular
publics, particular communities, could be treated in an
experimental fashion. Solutions to problems of the public were
to arise out of the examination, testing and predicting of
potential solutions to these problems. Indeed, the formation
of public interest was itself the communication of the results
of this public inquiry (1989, p. 107). In Dewey's estimation,
all those who have a stake in the consequences of the activity
of the one or the many have license to participate in this shared
inquiry, and thereby reap the results. This leaves open the
possibility that potentially all, inasmuch as certain broad
social policies affect the mass of peoples, could share in the
process of deliberative inquiry and the consequences thereby.
The public, however, does not have all of the tools
necessary to probe in experimental fashion the consequences
of particular activities. Inasmuch as certain factual data
demands precision in its compilation and evaluation, a
certain expertise is demanded of key players.(Dewey 1976,
p. 64).5 Now not every individual who constitutes the body
public is capable of performing these tasks. Thus it falls to
experts to carry out these needed activities. Experts are for
Dewey a necessary ingredient in inquiry of a public nature.
Their role, however, is a rather limited one. Specifically,
experts in a particular discipline or subject-matter do not
prescribe, from the results of inquiry, what is to be done.
Rather, the expert demonstrates to the inquiring public the
factual data upon which further analysis and pronouncements
depend. The concerned public, in evaluating the data
supplied by these experts, must, according to Dewey,".. .have
the ability to judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied
by others upon common concerns" (1989, p. 209).
The locus for decision-making with respect to the factual data presented by experts clearly falls upon the concerned
public. Inasmuch as the public must judge the implications
of adopting a certain response to shared social problems, the
public must as well be able to carry out the task of inquiry.
The authority invested in inquiry and its results demands vigilance on the part of the concerned public with respect to the
communication of findings and the judgement passed on various possible alternatives to problematic situations. This in
turns demands that the public be properly educated with respect to the tools and capacities of inquiry. Education, that is,
formal schooling, is the chief vehicle of supply for this
demand.
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Dewey's primary purpose of education is often said to
be "growth" or "direction." While this is certainly true, what
it implies is nevertheless the capacity and capability of the
individual to inquire. Inquiry and intelligence are among
(though by no means only) the chief attributes that education
must develop (1990, p. 28). Inquiry is necessary because it
functions as the chief instrument for the necessary communication and decision-making so important to conceiving and
maintaining an efficient, democratic public. As such the
teacher's job is to provide an environment conducive to the
formation and development of inquiry. She is saddled with
the responsibility of directing and re-directing the child such
that the child's own intellectual curiosity can take root and
blossom into a fully-fledged formalized and habituated
inquiry (1984, p. 25-26).6 Inasmuch as she helps nurture a
developing inquiry, she is providing the child with the means
to authority.
In this manner, social control in the classroom is
tantamount to assisting the child, through direction and
re-direction, to cultivate her own personal capacity for
inquiry. "Control, in truth, means only an emphatic form of
direction of powers, and covers the regulation gained by an
individual through his [sic] own efforts quite as much as that
brought about when others take the lead" (1990, p. 24).
Social control is present in the educative process, but it is a
means only. It serves to guide and direct the child's own
process of inquiry such that she, once the inquiry is
habitualized and developed, will have the capacity to determine for herself whether or not to value or participate in
certain social activities. It is a necessary means to what Dewey
terms "freedom." And since freedom "resides in the operations of intelligent observation and judgement by which a
purpose is developed, guidance given by the teacher... is an
aide to freedom, not a restriction upon it" (1991, p. 46).
The child participates in the direction that the teacher
sets. As Dewey argues, "nothing can be forced upon them or
into them" (1984, p. 25). In point of fact, the habits of
inquiry that the child develops are her own. The experiences
that help to cultivate those habits are also her own. Dewey
rejects the blank slate approach to learning, whereby the
teacher imparts while the student absorbs. Rather, the child
forms her habits of inquiry through the experiences she has.
True enough, the teacher provides opportunities for inquiry
to be used, and in this way prods the inquiry to higher and
more formalized stages. Dewey certainly applauds some
degree of social control. But any social control that is manifested by the teacher is to be merely one of direction and redirection (1984, p. 26). As Dewey eschewed more direct
means of authority in his insistence on the rejection of overt
disciplinary maneuvers and fixed dogmas, it fell to the teacher
to provide direction and re-direction in the name of the public interest. And again, the manner in which this was exerted
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was via the assistance of the teacher in the development of
the child's specific capacities of inquiry. The fundamental
means of control ultimately becomes intellectual selfcontrol through cultivation and application of inquiry (1984,
p. 33).
Now I wish to summarize what I have said so far. For
Dewey, authority is equated with organized intelligence.
Organized intelligence is akin to inquiry. Inquiry, although
certainly an individual capacity, is also a broadly social and
public one. In this manner, organized intelligence exists as a
public undertaking. Although the public is certainly charged
with the responsibility of judging the various means for
addressing social problems, yet it rely's on experts for the
gathering and distribution of factual data. The public, through
deliberation and communication of the results of inquiry,
attempts solutions to pressing concerns. The means for the
development of inquiry is education. Children (and adults)
are given direction and re-direction in the cultivation of their
own innate intellectual curiosity. This is what is meant by
social control. The result is a habitualized, formal instrument
of intelligence that is developed via certain experiences and
opportunities that are consciously guided from without but
nevertheless developed within. Although the experiences and
opportunities are to a certain degree shaped and directed, yet
the inquiry and habits developed are the child's own. Social
control via the development and guidance of inquiry gradually shifts to self-control in the utilization of the newly
developed instrument. The authority of inquiry is therefore
self-legitimizing: it is legitimized through the activity of the
inquiring broader public via the formal process of education.
In this manner inquiry begets and authorizes inquiry.
Part 3: A Response

to Dewey's

Critics

What I wish to attempt here is the bringing to bear of
Dewey's more fully considered model of inquiry on
certain arguments of Dewey's critics. I want to reiterate that
it is inquiry itself that legitimizes its own authority, and not a
particular class or group of people, as with Karier and the
Illinois school. But I also want to challenge the reading of
Diggins, who suggests that Dewey's conception of authority
is anemic, and, as it lies neither in historical knowledge nor
in transcendental principles, is of little use in operating as a
viable mechanism for social situations.
Let me begin with the Illinois school. Recall that this
school argued Dewey as having a strong authoritarian view
of social control. Recall that this authority consisted in a
certain technico-rational control exerted by a professional,
middle class typically represented by the university professor but also by teachers, engineers, and other professionals
as well. Recall also that this ruling class utilized science and
technology exclusively to manipulate others into believing
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in the possibility of such ends. With the Illinois school,
education became a means to garner control of children and
to inculcate in them the ideology of the expert, ruling class.
The Illinois school's argument hinges, I think, on two
assumptions. The first is that Dewey believed that the middle
class professionals, the "expert" class, as Karier has labeled
them, both had and insisted on the means to control broadly
public discourse on values to be determined, avenues to be
pursued, and decisions to be made. The second is that Dewey
believed education served as the locus and opportunity for
the inculcation of certain values with respect to science and
technology. To demonstrate that the Illinois school's arguments do not hold hinges on refuting these two claims.
The first claim is refuted by insisting, once again, that
Dewey emphatically rejected the idea that an expert ruling
class dictated social and public policy. Again, experts, as
Dewey maintains in The Public and its Problems, are there
to assemble and disseminate factual data. The broader public, using the means of organized intelligence, roughly translatable to intelligent inquiry, is to judge, based on the data,
what the best course of action with respect to the consequences, might be. The experts function as an important means
in this process. But they do not hold the lion's share of responsibility in making public decisions regarding the avenues
to pursue. That they influence the end reached and that they
do this from a position of non-neutrality is indisputable. It is
in the realm of the broader public, though, that the claims of
the experts must be weighed and judged and any decision
based upon the factual data ultimately arrived at. The experts,
as Dewey argues, do not reserve this function for themselves.
As to the second claim, the claim that education serves
as a means for manipulation and social control, this as well is
incorrect. Although education certainly does initially serve
as a means for social control, it does not occur in the manner
suggested by the Illinois school. Control comes ultimately
from within the individual experiencing and developing inquiry, and not from without. The child "owns" her habits and
experiences. They were always hers to develop or not. No
specific inculcation of certain values is thereby suggested by
Dewey. This includes values attached to science and technology. One is not expected to swallow the argument that
science and technology are universally beneficial. Rather, one
is expected to inquire about the possibilities of a particular
science and a particular technology in and for a particular
situation, a particular context, and then to form a reasoned
opinion on these based upon available evidence and suggested
consequences. There is a subtle but significant difference here.
No particular ideology or argument is suggested by Dewey
to be habitualized by the child without first passing the test
of inquiry. If the child determines through inquiring that a
particular use of technology or science is undesirable, then
so be it. It is that child's reasoned opinion and that cannot be
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taken away. In this manner, the child, as inquiry becomes
more and more formalized, is able to determine what to value
and appreciate based upon her own judgment. Guidance and
direction, once necessary for this development, gradually
become less and less a factor. What was once direction and
re-direction on the part of the teacher passes to self-control
as intelligence becomes more and more a dominant factor.
John Patrick Diggins' arguments are ultimately more
penetrating than the Illinois school's. Recall that Diggins
argued Dewey a weak philosopher of authority. That is, rather
than hinging authority on predetermined ends or timeless
metaphysical principles, authority is equated with experience
and the judgments based upon experience. It is not legitimized by any particular social body, rather the individual
experiencer. As such, it becomes a very self-interested
authority, with little to say over such issues that predominantly social problems generate. In terms of education,
Diggins argues that, as there are no pre-determined educational ends that serve as authoritative markers for guidance
and control, and, as the teacher is unable to exert any particular authority, there cannot be a strong enough conception of
authority in the classroom to render any particular value
trenchant.
Now Diggins is absolutely correct about Dewey rejecting any metaphysical principles as the authoritative basis for
subsequent valuation. There is no extricating Dewey from
this. As a consequence, anyone who posits that antecedent or
transcendental rights or virtues are a necessary component to
the social transmission of authority will be unsatisfied with
Dewey's estimation. Again, there is, I think, no getting around
this. However, Diggins is incorrect in assuming that because
Dewey hangs much on individual experience, he thereby has
little to say regarding authority of a social nature. Diggins
seems to forget about Dewey's rather strong statements
regarding authority in his social, political, and educational
writings, preferring to focus on Dewey's more experiential
works, such as Experience and Nature. As a consequence, he
misses much that Dewey has to say about the locus and
legitimation of authority. If Diggins were to concentrate more
specifically on works such as Human Nature and Conduct
and The Public and its Problems, he would find, I think, that
Dewey has much to say about authority as the organized
intelligence of a public or social group brought to bear on
specific problems. True, Diggins is correct when he ascertains that the inquiry manifested by the individual inquirer in
response to certain experiences is the locus of authority. But
this applies only to the individual in the context of having
certain individual experiences. Inasmuch as that individual
shares and participates in social activities, and the consequences of social activities impact upon her, there is a need
for that individual's inquiring capacities to be pressed into
service for the good of the public. In this manner, individual
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inquiry becomes social inquiry. The results of a group of
people inquiring about a specific problem or set of anticipated consequences are communicated from the group to
others, so that they may in turn benefit from the process. The
results of inquiry are themselves deliberated upon.
Certain results from the inquiry of consequences become
valued. These values hold until a further problem necessitates their reexamination. These values pass as customs via,
as Dewey says, the speech patterns of a particular group, to
that group's progeny. The values hold, in turn, until the
process of inquiry is developed and formalized in that progeny such that they can make reasonable judgments regarding
those customs and values. If certain values or customs or
legislation becomes intolerable due to anticipated or
unanticipated consequences, those individual inquirers who
are saddled with the problem must have the opportunity to
deliberate publicly the various avenues of change. Authority
is vested in the decisions made by the inquiring public. But
this authority is contingent upon the possible consequences
arising from the decisions made. Again, if it is found that the
consequences of a particular decision necessitate its
withdrawal in favor of another, the authority to perform the
activity of withdrawal is provided for and by, public inquiry.
In this way, the authority of any particular decision only seems
to reside in the valued decision; in reality, it resides in the
inquiry itself. But again, this inquiry, while certainly of an
individual nature, as Diggins correctly points out, is also of a
public one. Inasmuch as certain values, decisions and legislations of the public serve to affect individuals, the need and
possibility for a public inquiry manifests itself. This public
inquiry is saturated with authority, inasmuch as it is the power
and capacity for organized, intelligent deliberation and
communication of actions towards anticipated and real
consequences. As a result, Diggins is incorrect in saddling
individual experience with being the final arbiter of
authority.
As to Diggins' concerns regarding the lack of ends in
education and the absence of teacher authority, he is, in the
main, correct. Any ends in education must be determined
through a procedure of inquiry. These ends are contingent
ones only. That is, they cannot hold for all time, but must
surrender themselves as necessary if certain consequences
dictate. The broad aims of education under the banners of
"growth" and "inquiry" are certainly no refutation of this.
Teachers have little traditional authority. They do have the
means and right to guide and direct children in pursuing their
own experiences, and it is in this capacity that their authority
resides, and so Diggins does overstate his argument when he
posits that teachers lack any authority. Nevertheless, this, I
do not think, would satisfy Diggins. Inasmuch as this
authority is not exclusive but rather hinges on the developing
experiences and inquiry of the children involved, it is of
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itself transient. As children age and their capacity for inquiry
broadens and formalizes, more and more self-direction seems
to be involved, and less and less teacher direction is necessary. This is certainly not a strong enough conception of
teacher authority to satisfy someone who craves "ends" as
Diggins does. In this respect, Dewey would continue to leave
Diggins unimpressed.
Conclusion
Dewey certainly does have a response to the combined
criticisms of the Illinois School and John Patrick Diggins. To
the Illinois School, who complain that Dewey has a strong
conception of authority bound up in the technico-rational
enterprise of science and technology led by an elite professional, middle class, Dewey can retaliate by arguing that it is
the public who formulate decisions based upon social consequences and not a group of experts. Experts, rather, provide
factual data that the public then judges. The means forjudging comes from inquiry, which all are to cultivate, primarily
through the educational process, whose prime responsibility
therefore, is assistance with the development of the child's
own individual inquiring experiences.
To John Patrick Diggins, Dewey has only a partial
response. Inasmuch as experience is the means and context
within which an individual inquires, Diggins is quite correct
that inquiry is an individual affair. But this individual affair
becomes public when the activities of others form consequences for the one. The inquiry then shifts to the public
domain. Through judgment of the consequences, communities and groups composed of individuals share and deliberate
on better courses of actions. Policies are produced as a result
of inquiry taking place within the context of conjoint, public
communication. What was once an individual affair now
becomes public as inquiry is charged with finding the best
course of action for a community of peoples.
Nevertheless, Diggins is correct in his charge that Dewey
has no metaphysical conception of authority. There are no
"ends" that authority can hang onto. Authority, inasmuch as
it depends on the results of settled inquiry, is contingent.
Neither the public, the schools, the teachers or the experts
own it. It comes rather, out of a process of inquiry into
problematic situations that have a judgment rendered. It
exists as long as further deliberation does not remove it. In
the end, it is found among the inquiries themselves, as only
inquiries have the capacity to authenticate a decision and
stamp it as of certain value. This is cold comfort to those who
wish for an authority based upon historical knowledge, metaphysical ends, religious dogma, or the power of a ruling class.
However, it is all that Dewey is willing to provide.

A U T H O R I T Y , S O C I A L C H A N G E , A N D E D U C A T I O N : A R E S P O N S E T O D E W E Y ' S CRITICS

Notes
1. Westbrook invokes Clarence Karier, Walter Feinberg,
David Hogan, and Paul Violas as those revisionist historians
of the Illinois school. Needless to say, he has little liking for
them. It should be noted that Feinberg has distanced himself
from this "revisionist Illinois school," and therefore should
probably not be included. For more on this distancing, C.F.
Feinberg, W. (1993, Vol. 43, No. 2. Spring). "Dewey and
Democracy at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century."
Educational Theory, pp. 195-216. Also, personal communication, Jan, 2000. There is a history of this term. Diane Ravitch
earlier called a number of these critics "the revisionists" in
her defense of liberal education. C.F. Ravitch, D. (1978). The
Revisionists Revised. New York: Basic Books.
2. Interestingly enough, while she suggests students can
be manipulated, Raywid rejects this hypothesis in a further
article. Here, she denies that Dewey believed in or held to the
indoctrination of students. She argued that Dewey correctly
held that one cannot "stamp in" a commitment to the exercise of intelligence. Rather, this must be developed by the
individual. C.F. Raywid, M. A. (1992). "The Discovery and
Rejection of Indoctrination." in John Dewey: Critical Assessments Vol. 2, edited by. J.E. Tiles. London: Routledge p. 300.
Whether this is tantamount to saying that intelligence cannot
be habitualized is another matter, though, and depends upon
what one means precisely by habituation. As I will argue later
in this paper, Dewey's views on habituation have less to do
with external imposition and more to do with organic and
native responses to problems.
3. Feinberg, interestingly enough, argues that intellectual curiosity is itself a habit. He is here trying to dispute the
contrast between socialization and education. The crux of the
argument is that intellectual curiosity is not perhaps part of a
formalized education, but rather itself socialization. This
seems to render more problematic the possibility that a child
could genuinely and of her own self-interest come to
embrace a technological and scientific approach to problemsolving, as Raywid in "the discovery and rejection of indoctrination" wants to suggest. Dewey, I would argue, accepts
neither of these two alternatives exclusively, but (as with
Raywid) posits that intellectual curiosity, while able to be
cultivated, yet rises naturally and spontaneously in every
human organism, yet is also a habit (as with Feinberg), but
not one that is externally imposed, rather a natural outgrowth
of the organism. C.F. Dewey, J. (1991). "Logic: The Theory
of Inquiry." In The Later Works of John Dewey Vol 12. 1938.
Ed. JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Esp. pp. 37-38.
4. Interestingly enough, Diggins takes the arguments from
the other side, those that posit a strong authoritarian social
control predicated upon an expert, professional class, as "a
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surprise." C.F. p. 313.
5. Dewey, addressing the importance of the professional class of academics, makes a slightly different argument as to why this class is important than perhaps Karier
would. Dewey argues "If security and responsibility of
intellectual organization are worth anything to the nation, then
the professors' efforts to get a responsible share in college
control form a public service." This does not imply that
professors have a right to the lion's share of public decisionmaking, rather only a responsible one. What is responsible is
of course, not discussed. But it does not imply, I think, that
Dewey expected professors to be public leaders; rather only
participants in a greater public discourse about what to value
and what avenues to pursue. In Dewey, J. (1985). "The Case
of the Professor and the Public Interest." In The Middle Works
of John Dewey Vol. 10.1916-1917, edited by JoAnn Boydston.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 164-167.
esp p. 166.
6. It is perhaps concluded that Dewey advocated that
teachers should have more authority to operate unhindered
from administrative and political concerns. In the main this
is true. But not because Dewey wanted to rest authority for
its own sake in teachers, but rather because he felt that teachers were inadequately represented in the broader community,
and therefore had little voice. For example, Dewey argued
"...that is the great reason for forming organizations of this
kind, and organizations which are affiliated with other working organizations that have power and that attempt to
exercise the power.. .namely, the reflex effect upon the body
of the teachers themselves in strengthening their courage, their
faith in their calling, their faith in one another, and the recognition that they are servants of the community, and not people
hired by a certain transitory set of people to do a certain job
at their beck and call." In Dewey, J. (1985). "Professional
Organization of Teachers." In The Middle Works of John
Dewey Vol. 10, edited by JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 168-172., p. 169. This
is also his claim for the call to teachers to increase their as yet
unheard contributions to the "science" of education that is
set out in Dewey, J. (1990). "The Sources of a Science of
Education." In The Later Works of John Dewey, Vol. 5. 19291930, edited by JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, p. 23.
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